The Red Queen's notion "It takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place" has been applied within evolutionary biology, politics and economics. We find that a generalized 2 How has the Afghanistan insurgency consistently managed to increase the frequency of fatal attacks against a far stronger force -the coalition military? Inspired by recent suggestions from the evolutionary biology community that fast adaptation is a key to survival (1-3), we use progress curves (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) to analyze the daily 'production' of military fatalities by the insurgency within individual provinces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Progress curves (or 'functions') (5) are a widely used tool for quantifying how human productivity changes over time, e.g. in industrial manufacturing (4-7), software installation (10) and even cancer surgery (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) . The province-by-province progress curves reveal a remarkable regularity that we explain in terms of a dynamical arms race between an adaptive Red Queen (i.e. insurgents) and her counter-adapting Blue King opponent (i.e. coalition military). Practical consequences include a tool that could help predict future fatal days for the military, and a new perspective on how insurgent conflicts evolve at the level of individual provinces. More broadly, our work identifies potentially generic dynamics for any competitive interaction between asymmetric populations (e.g. virus versus immune system), and establishes new connections between the search for effective counterinsurgency strategies, evolutionary biology, industrial manufacturing, and the physics of correlated walks (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) .
How has the Afghanistan insurgency consistently managed to increase the frequency of fatal attacks against a far stronger force -the coalition military? Inspired by recent suggestions from the evolutionary biology community that fast adaptation is a key to survival (1-3), we use progress curves (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) to analyze the daily 'production' of military fatalities by the insurgency within individual provinces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Progress curves (or 'functions') (5) are a widely used tool for quantifying how human productivity changes over time, e.g. in industrial manufacturing (4) (5) (6) (7) , software installation (10) and even cancer surgery (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) . The province-by-province progress curves reveal a remarkable regularity that we explain in terms of a dynamical arms race between an adaptive Red Queen (i.e. insurgents) and her counter-adapting Blue King opponent (i.e. coalition military). Practical consequences include a tool that could help predict future fatal days for the military, and a new perspective on how insurgent conflicts evolve at the level of individual provinces. More broadly, our work identifies potentially generic dynamics for any competitive interaction between asymmetric populations (e.g. virus versus immune system), and establishes new connections between the search for effective counterinsurgency strategies, evolutionary biology, industrial manufacturing, and the physics of correlated walks (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) .
Our data and analysis are freely available for public scrutiny: The coalition military fatality data come from the publicly accessible website www.iCasualties.org, which is highly regarded as reliable and independent (28), while our analysis is performed using the free downloadable tool Open Office which runs on any computer platform (see Appendix). For Afghanistan, we include Figures 1(a) and (b) show how we use the standard progress curve form τ n = τ 1 n −b (4, 5) to describe the non-stationary nature of fatal days for the coalition military within each province. We define a fatal day for a particular province P as one on which at least one coalition military died as a result of hostile activities. Progress curves are obtained for fatal days resulting from any hostile activity, and for particular subsets filtered by method (e.g. IED). For the scenario that the data follows the progress curve perfectly in Fig. 1(b) , τ 1 is the time interval between the first two fatal days labelled n = 0 and n = 1. The value of b is of crucial practical importance since it determines how fast the time interval between consecutive fatal days decreases (see Fig. 1(b) ). The insurgents would like b to be large and positive so that subsequent time-intervals τ n decrease quickly from the initial value τ 1 , while the military wish b to be negative so that τ n actually increases. The amount of scatter in Fig. 1(b) is consistent with progress curves from many non-conflict applications including successive operations by a medical surgery team (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) , and is to be expected given the struggle underway. The minimal timescale is one day (i.e. τ n ≥ 1) since iCasualties does not contain intraday detail. We do not consider non-fatal events (i.e. no coalition military casualties) since they occur almost every day and so do not generate interesting progress curves (i.e. τ n ≈ 1 for all n).
Alternative progress-curve analytic forms have been debated (8) --however any such twoparameter progress curve amounts to a complex nonlinear transformation of the conventional power form that we use, and hence simply generates a more complex version of Fig. 1(c) . We have checked alternative forms, but we find their fits to be no better than the conventional power form. values yields the predicted time-interval between the first fatal day in P (i.e. Τ n =0 ) and the n 'th. We stress that this n'th fatal day might lie months or years in the future. The agreement is surprisingly good, given that we are predicting fatal days which may be several years into the future, and that the only input is the time interval between the first two events τ 1 which will understandably be noisy for an insurgent conflict. Indeed, the prediction accuracy for IED fatalities is achieved by estimating b from the all-hostile curve without having to filter out non-IED events and hence suffer from sparser data, i.e. we simply used the all hostile results in Fig.   1 (c) without province P. Other Afghanistan provinces show fairly similar results, as does pre-surge
Iraq discussed later, with even the worst-case prediction having the correct order of magnitude. Our prediction assumes that the progress curve does not experience any significant structural changes, hence the fact that the empirical data tends to move above the predicted curve as n increases,
suggests that the military's ability to disrupt insurgency activity is increasing over time. In addition to operational planning, this prediction tool can be used to estimate the likely trajectory of fatal attacks in a region which has, so far, been relatively quiet (e.g. only two fatal days so far, and hence only τ 1 is known). If a significant deviation suddenly arises between the predicted and actual curve, this serves as an indicator that the conflict in that region is experiencing a fundamental shift (see Appendix). We have found that the subsequent prediction accuracy can then be restored by restarting the count of fatal days from that later time. Depending on the availability of reliable daily data, future work will test this scheme on other conflicts.
One might argue that any such prediction scheme is useless once known publicly since it can be invalidated by insurgents' free will. However we believe that this will not happen for the same reason that all commuters know that a traffic jam will appear every day at rush hour on a certain route, yet many still end up joining it. External constraints of working hours, school schedules and finite numbers of direct roads, mean that such predictability is hard to avoid.
Similarly, the spontaneity of fatal attacks by the insurgency is likely constrained by many factors, including the availability of troop convoys, explosive materials, and sympathy within the local population. We start by defining R to be the Red Queen's lead over her opponent (Blue King).
R represents a real distance in a running race, or a more abstract strategic advantage in an arms race. The traditional Red Queen story involves her running as fast as she can in order to stay at the same place (31, 32) . This implies that the Blue King instantaneously and perfectly counter-adapts to any Red Queen advance, such that they are always neck and neck (i.e. R = 0). However, such instantaneous and perfect counter-adaptation would be unlikely in practice. Reference 1 suggests that the Red Queen insurgency may adapt faster than her larger, and possibly more sluggish, Blue
King military opponent. The Red Queen could then sporadically edge ahead (i.e. increase R) as a result of fast adaptation to new technology, information, past experience etc., and/or the inability of the Blue King to instantaneously reduce R again. The Red Queen's lead R would then undergo a jerky but gradual increase. Even if the actual dynamics of R were known, they would likely be so complex as to appear seemingly random. This motivates us to exploit a trick commonly used in
Physics (27) : We simply mimic this complex, jerky 'walk' using repeated tosses of a coin, where throwing a heads increases R by one while a tails reduces R by one. We hence generate an R Since we wish to explain the behavior of Figs. 1(c) and 3, we henceforth focus on the case where R is predominantly positive, i.e. the Red Queen sporadically edges ahead of the Blue King.
The larger R becomes, the larger the insurgent advantage and hence the more likely that any particular day has military fatalities. We therefore assume that the size of R is a proxy for the insurgents' rate of production of fatal days at that moment. It is also reasonable to expect that large Clauset for broad discussions surrounding this topic and to L. Amaral for earlier discussions concerning non-Poissonian behavior.
Iraq:
All data were prepared in OpenOffice.org Calc, starting with the "All_Data_Iraq" sheet from "iCasualties_Raw_Data_v2.ods."
For the file "Iraq_Filtered.ods" the following filters were used.
All IED: Standard filter, reason contains " ied" (with a space)
All Hostile: Standard filter, reason does not contain "non-hostile" AND reason does not contain "Not reported yet" AND reason does not contain "friendly"
Filters for Provinces are self-explanatory. The time lag is computed by setting the formula '=a3-a2' and dragging it down for all other rows. Multiple events on the same date are combined by filtering for tau>0 and copying to a new sheet (to correct row numbers).
The document "Iraq_Filtered_Tau.ods" is the same as "Iraq_Filtered.ods" except that the former is filtered for tau>0.
B. OPEN OFFICE ANALYSIS
From the files "Iraq_Filtered_Tau.ods" and "Afghan_Filtered_Tau.ods" the following procedure is used to obtain development curves within OpenOffice.org Calc:
On the sheet containing the data of interest (depending on what province and what cause of death) highlight all the tau values, place on a log-log scale, and create a power fit. See main paper for a discussion of the shift between pre and post-surge behaviors.
In Iraq, it is necessary to first define an n-shift date before making development curves. The n-shift is defined as the minimum value of the cumulative moving average after the first 15 events, except in Qadisiyah which only has a total of 15 IED events, thus the global minimum is used there. The file "pre_nshift_devcurves.ods" contains these development curves, with the n shift dates for each province highlighted.
Once power regressions of the form A x −b are made, a plot of log(A) vs b can be generated. For a given province, generate a log(A) vs b plot that omits its data, and obtain a linear regression b=mlog(A)+c. Input the provinces first tau value for A and thus obtain a prediction for b. This can then be passed into the prediction formula as described in the main paper.
Wikileaks Data:
The file "Wikileaks_Afghan.ods" contains the entire IED-related database released by Wikileaks. From this file, filter for "FriendlyKIA>0" and then generate tau values as before. Filter for tau>0 and generate a power regression. This should be equivalent to the development curve from IED events over all provinces in Afghanistan, and provides a check for how much the Wikileaks and iCasualties databases differ. As confirmed in Fig. 3 , essentially the same results are obtained from both for the progress curves aggregated across all provinces. Since the province information in Wikileaks tends to be given in terms of coordinates as opposed to names, we could only compare to the iCasualties data at the level of the entire country. The fact that the two sources are then in excellent agreement is reassuring, given the possible problems with any casualty dataset gathered under conflict conditions.
2: Analysis of timelines of events etc.
The After picking these categories, we methodically went through every single event on the aforementioned timelines and picked out the ones we judged as most likely to be relevant. In this way, we tried to minimize noise. The figure below shows the results (i.e. orange bars) for all these categories combined -however, similar conclusions are obtained for just individual (or combinations of subsets of) categories. We could find no combination of these exogenous timelines that could be seen as a nucleation of the military fatality timelines. In particular, when we calculated the best-fit progress curves, the fits were not only very poor (far poorer than the typical fatal day data), but they also gave rise to b,τ 1
( )
values that were qualitatively different from the ones shown for individual provinces in Figs. 1(c) and 3 -both for all hostile fatalities and also just IED fatalities. Hence the comment in the main paper that these events do not seem to be the dominant driving force. Instead, their effect presumably feeds in with all the other factors in some complex way that remains to be determined.
Figure caption: Timelines for Afghanistan. Orange corresponds to relevant national events (e.g. political) extracted according to recipe in Appendix. Blue corresponds to fatal days from insurgent attacks. There is no strong evidence to suggest that these exogenous events (orange) nucleate the military fatal days (blue). In particular, not only is the progress curve a poor fit to the national events (worse than the fit to fatal days) but also the best-fit parameter values b and τ 1 are very different from the ones shown for fatal days in Figs. 1(c) and 3.
3: Narrative concerning loose coordination
In addition to the feature of a common enemy (i.e. coalition military), we give here some example narratives which support the idea of an indirect, loose coordination between Afghanistan and Iraq, and hence which offer an explanation for the prominent quasi-linear pattern describing the combined Afghanistan-Iraq datapoints in Fig. 3 :
Insurgents going from Afghanistan to Iraq: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Qaeda_in_Iraq Insurgents going from Iraq to Afghanistan: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/15/world/asia/15afghanistan.html http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/remember-afghanistan-insurgents-bring-suicideterror-to-country-523323.html
4: Post-surge Iraq
As noted in the main paper, the progress curves within individual Iraqi provinces exhibit a shift point n shift separating two regimes. Their initial behavior is typical of the Afghanistan conflict (i.e. Fig. 1(b) ), while a second regime arises toward the end of the Iraq conflict and features τ n generally increasing. In short, the fatal days in post-surge Iraq exhibit a general increase in τ n . The overall behavior tends to mirror the pre-surge results but with negative b values if we reset the fatal day count (i.e. set n = 0) to start from n shift . In addition to any intrinsic operational interest, this concurrence of an increase in τ n with an increase in troops demonstrates that more troops does not necessarily equate to more fatal attacks (and hence more frequent fatal days). In other words, the patterns we find in the progress curve behavior are not simply linked to an increase in the number of troops and hence an increase in the number of targets.
We have tried many different ways of defining the shift value n shift , along the theme of moving averages with different window sizes etc. We found that neither the precise choice -nor the precise definition --have much affect on the progress curve results show in Fig. 3 . We chose a cumulative moving average for Fig. 3 since it is a common tool in spreadsheet programs and has a concrete implementation, hence can be checked easily by readers.
5: Mathematical details underlying Red Queen walk R(n)

A coin-toss walk
Suppose we toss a fair (i.e. unbiased) coin. A coin has no memory of past outcomes, which is another way of saying it has no correlations in the time-series of its outcomes. Heads (H) and tails (T) have equal probability of occurring, and this is independent of what outcomes have previously arisen. We denote the coin-toss outcome at a given step i as having value As discussed in the main paper, the provinces appearing in Figs. 1(c) and 3 are by definition ones with fatal days. Since we wish to explain their features, we will focus on walks with R > 0 since these are the ones dominated by Red Queen advances and hence are the ones which are likely to produce enough fatal days to appear in Figs. 1(c) and 3. Whether the walk ends up with R > 0 by insurgents' good fortune (i.e. a winning streak of Heads being tossed), or whether it is because of clever tactics, does not affect the mathematics. Because of the unbiased nature of a coin-toss, approximately half of all walks will end up in the region R > 0 (i.e. walk is dominated by Red Queen advances). This suggests that approximately half of all provinces should have enough fatal days to show up in Figs. 1(c) and 3. This is indeed roughly what is observed, as mentioned in the main paper. The other half of all walks end up in the region R < 0. These are the ones where the Blue King dominates, and these mimic a non-violent province. The traditional situation of the Blue King instantaneously and perfectly counteradapting to every Red Queen move, just as she is about to make it, is impossible in practice --and also does not arise in this model, since we have successive coin-toss outcomes and somebody has to win at each step. Even if the Blue King always catches up in the next step, this is not instantaneous adaptation-counteradaptation. A 'timestep' in the coin-toss model is, as explained in the main paper, a step from a given n to the next value n + 1 since fatal days are assumed to act as the dominant ticks of the clock.
Statistical properties of R(n)
We now consider the statistical properties of the average and variance for R n ( ) after n steps. Our notation for the change in R n ( ) at step is . Hence the change between step 0 and is given by . The mean change between step 0 and is:
which is the well-known result that the average of the sum is equal to the sum of the averages. Equation For the case of the coin-toss walk above, we have where the average includes all possible walks in the 'tree' (see figure) . Hence for all . The variance is as follows:
Collecting up the cross terms, gives contributions of the form Δx i Δx j − Δx i Δx j which is a crucially important quantity. It connects past outcomes to current outcomes (i.e. Δx i at step i to Δx j at step j ). It will only be non-zero if there is some kind of memory (i.e. correlation) in the process. This is not the case for a coin toss since a coin has no memory. However, more generally there will be some kind of memory -albeit subtle -and hence these terms play a crucial role in either increasing or decreasing the variance, hence increasing or decreasing the typical walk size, and hence affecting the b value in the particular way discussed below. These terms are called correlation terms, which is why a system having correlations is often referred to as a system with memory. and hence the typical size of the Red Queen's lead over the entire conflict to date with fatal days, now increases as (5.8) as stated in the main paper. In other words, the typical size of the Red Queen's walk over n fatal days (i.e. steps) increases as n b where b = 1. This makes sense: think of walking purposely in a straight line at constant velocity. The distance moved is now proportional to the number of timesteps n, i.e. n b =1 as opposed to n b =0.5 . In the more general case of some limited but non-zero level of positive correlation (i.e. some memory), the corresponding expression for the typical size of R (i.e. root-mean-square) will therefore lie between the uncorrelated case of n b =0.5 and the perfectly correlated case of n b =1 . By contrast, if the changes are anti-correlated (i.e. their correlation is negative), then the dependence will be more like n b =0 as stated in the main paper.
Hence in general (i.e. in the presence of correlations) the Red Queen's walk will have the property that the typical size of the walk after time-steps increases as n b , where b takes a value which is typically in the range 0 to 1, but may be higher if the feedback is positive (i.e. Red Queen is not only walking in straight line but is also accelerating as she walks). This confirms that b = 0.5 acts as a crude midpoint (see green dashed line in Figs. 1(c) and 3 of main paper) . We note that the terminology employed in polymer physics, is that a 'persistent walk' corresponds to b > 0.5 while an 'anti-persistent walk' corresponds to 0 ≤ b < 0.5.
Multi dimensional Red Queen walk
Although this section is likely to be of more interest to physical scientists, in particular statistical physicists including polymer physicists, we note that the present analysis of a stochastic walk in one dimension can be generalized to higher dimensions -where the individual axes in this higher dimensional space represent different types of strategic advantage. For completeness, we now present this discussion though we stress that it is not needed for the general reader's understanding of the main paper. Following the n'th successful event, the relative separation between the Red Queen's and Blue King's strategies, tactics and/or technological advantage, is now a vector 
